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ABSTRACT: The author analyzes the successful strategy of overcoming financial 
breakdown in the case study of Iceland. The aim of the article is to verify 
a hypothesis that the Icelandic model could become a panacea for future 
crises? A document analysis method is applied to present essential indicators 
such as GDP and trade balance. With the use of a source analysis method, the 
collapse of the financial sector is determined as the main cause of the slump. 
The systematization of crisis events is introduced and deepened by the social 
and political situation. Changes in the state’s condition after the crash are 
provided and future forecasts about economic development are discussed. As 
a summing up, the author disapproves of the hypothesis that the Icelandic model 
of overcoming the financial breakdown as a panacea for future crises, pointing 
out that it is only applicable for specific cases and cannot be seen as a magical 
remedy for every kind of crisis.
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Introduction
According to the Oxford dictionary a crisis is “a time of great 
danger, difficulty or confusion when problems must be solved or 
important decisions must be made”. S. Miklaszewski defines 
a financial crisis as sudden changes in financial markets connected 
with liquidity shortage of entities, insolvency of participants and 
state intervention in economic processes. As W. Nawrot points out 
due to globalization, which is defined as dynamic development not 
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only of societies but also technology, the face of financial markets 
change as well. On the one hand, it is a modern, cross border system 
creating unlimited opportunities for all participants of markets. 
On the other, this system is incredibly vulnerable to diverse slump 
occurrences. In the globalized world, a domino effect can take hold 
– the fast transmission of crises to markets, especially financial 
ones. The last financial crash stressed the growing role of the global 
market and demand mobility in the international view (Mitręga-
Niestrój, 159).
The global financial crisis, which began in USA in 2007, is one 
of the biggest breakdowns in the world economic history and is often 
compared to the Great Depression of the 1930s. This breakdown 
was not merely an issue that influenced markets and financial 
institutions. In fact, it threatened the real economy of the whole 
world and “particularly affected the banking sector, crucial for the 
proper functioning of individual countries as well as international 
systems. Therefore this crisis had extremely negative consequences 
for entrepreneurships and households” (Mitręga-Niestrój, 160).
In literature one can find many descriptions of the Icelandic 
strategy of overcoming the crisis, which are presented by many 
authors as a magical cure, and the Icelandic government’s 
intervention is widely regarded as successful, not only for the 
economic development of the state, but also (and most importantly) 
for Icelandic citizens. Very often it is contrasted with the case of 
Greece. The author, using the method of literature analysis, both 
Polish and foreign, and the monographic method, appraises the 
causes and timeline of the Icelandic crash and creates a forecast for 
futures situations in Iceland. The document analysis method, using 
data from Hagstofa Íslands, is applied to present essential economic 
indicators before the crisis and provide forecasts. The aim of the 
following article is to verify the hypothesis that the Icelandic model 
can be a panacea for crises for other countries.
General characteristics of the Icelandic state
Iceland is a country between Europe and North America. The 
current population is 329 000 people, which with an area of 103 
5000 km2 has a density of 3.19 person per km2. The capital region 
(Garðabær, Hafnarfjorður, Kópavogur, Mosfellsbær and Reykjavík) is 
inhabited by more than 1/3 of the country’s entire population. In 
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Iceland there are only 30 cities with over 1000 inhabitants (the second 
biggest is Akureyri on the North of the island, with a population of 
almost 20 000). The main natural resources are geothermal energy, 
water and aluminum. Manufacturing represents 36% of exports. One 
of the biggest economic sectors is aluminum smelting in 3 aluminum 
plants: Straumsvik (1969), Grundartangi (1998), and Reyðarfjörður 
(April 2008). The base of the Icelandic economy is the fishing industry 
– catches exceed 13 000 tons per year. Only after the crisis did the 
role of tourism grow significantly. Current statistics show that 70% of 
citizens are employed in tourism and this sector generates more than 
23% of export income (Tourism in Iceland 2). Iceland was visited by 
almost 1,792,200 people in 20161, (it’s 2017!!)
The Icelandic banking sector, crucial in the context of the events 
in 2008, is led by the Central Bank (Seðlabanki Íslands) that was 
established in 1961. Seðlabanki is in charge of the monetary policy 
implementation in Iceland as well as:
• promoting an efficient and safe financial system;
• issuance of notes and coins;
• regulating interest rates;
• maintaining and managing the foreign exchange reserves.
Apart from Seðlabankiin Iceland there are three main banks 
(names before crisis in brackets):
• New Landsbanki (Landsbanki),
• Arion Bank (Kaupthing bank),
• Islandsbanki (Glitinir).
The Icelandic stock market has operated since 1985, with 
ICEX15 as its main index.
Before the crisis, Iceland could pride itself on a significant 
inflow of foreign capital (direct and portfolio investment). In the 
period between 2000–2004, the value of foreign direct investments 
(FDI) was 2–3% of GDP, and in 2007 the FDI was 33% of GDP 
(Wajda-Lichy 192). That phenomenon was connected with the 
privatization process in the banking sector that started in 2000 as 
well as the effective promotion of Iceland as a financial center 
with a cornerstone of the three biggest commercial banks (Glitnir, 
Landsbanki and Kaupthing Bank). The strategy of the financial 
sector’s expansion has been implemented since 2007.
From the beginning of the 21st century, Icelandic economy was 
transformed into one that was dynamic, developed and globalized. 
1 https://www.ferdamalastofa.is/static/files/ferdamalastofa/Frettamyndir/2017/
juli/tourism-in-iceland-2017-9.pdf
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At the beginning of the decade, growth in its current account 
balance was mainly due to the construction of an aluminum plant 
in Reyðarfjörður. The role of exports was gradually growing and in 
2007 they exceeded imports by over 25% (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Exports and imports between 2004–2014 (million ISK)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Export 202373 194355,3 242740 305095,8 466859,5 500854,5 561032,2 620127,4 633029,1 610691,6 590501,7 
Import 240160 288894,8 401201,5 397241,1 473524,7 410574,8 440820,9 522985,3 555695,4 541361,9 586251,8 
Balance of trade -37787 -94539,5 -158461,5 -92145,3 -6665,2 90279,7 120211,2 97142,1 77333,7 69329,7 4249,9 
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Figure 2. Exports between 2004–2013
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
EEA 158370,5 150248,6 181970,3 239116,4 376063 418346,9 458939 512894,5 495807,5 
Other European countries 8796 8906,9 15086,8 13903,9 18789,1 19711 32838,8 35562,4 50535,8 
USA 18769 16299,2 26131,3 16049,7 25720,1 19402,9 25429 22959,1 28338,1 
Japan 6076,7 6262,1 5019,2 12775,6 20453 9304,5 14283,4 15443,3 12925,1 
Other countries 10360,9 12638,5 14532,3 23250,1 25834,5 34089,3 29541,9 33268,2 45422,6 
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Markets, where most of the goods and services were exported 
from Iceland, were (and still are) countries participating in The 
European Economic Area (EEA). At the beginning of the decade, 
the second biggest market was the USA. After the financial crisis 
this has changed. Other European countries became the second 
biggest market. Recently this pattern of growth has been noticed 
in non-European markets possibly because of the poor economic 
situation in Western countries (Figure 2).
The estimates above clearly indicate an intensive development of 
the Icelandic economy at the beginning of the 21st century. In 2004, 
economic growth. The average level of income per capita (ppp) was 
far higher than the average in the Eurozone.
Figure 3. Inflation rate 2004–2014
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Inﬂa�on (CPI) 3,2 4 6,8 5 12,4 12 5,4 4 5,2 3,9 2 
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Source: Own elaboration, data: http://www.hagstofa.is/
In 2001, Seðlabanki had introduced an inflation target of 2.5% 
(with a range of 1.5%), that proved to be a sufficient method to limit 
inflation. It dropped from 6% in 2001 to 2% in 2003 (Figure 3). 
In the following years inflation started to grow again and from 
2005 was above the inflation target. This caused Seðlabanki to raise 
interest rates. As a result, the inflow of foreign capital grew and was 
not a sufficient tool to reduce demand. A simultaneous reduction in 
taxes fuelled inflationary pressures.
Iceland before the crisis was characterized with a low 
unemployment rate (Figure 4). Between 2006–2008 it was between 
1–1.6%. A jump in unemployment in 2009 (up to 6.5%) was observed 
due to the economic crisis. By 2014 this rate had dropped significantly 
and was only 3.6% and in July 2017 it hit the lowest – 1%.
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Figure 4. Unemployment rate between 2004–2014 
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Causes of the Icelandic crisis
In 2008, the Icelandic economy was the first in the European 
system to be severely undermined by the financial crisis. Iceland 
represents a group of small states as well as small open economy 
– countries that are highly dependent on exports and imports of 
goods, that is more vulnerable than most to market fluctuations. 
Small state economies put pressure on specializations and economy 
of scale, to be able to compete in the international market. This 
usually leads to the export of one or two types of products. As 
Baldur Thorhallsson (2013) suggests that due to these factors 
smalls states are generally on the front line of these crises.
The case of the Icelandic economy, that is dependent on the export 
of fish products, fits perfectly into the small state scenario during 
a recession. After the privatization of three of the biggest banks in 
2004, the Icelandic banking sector expanded by over 900% of GDP 
and led to higher levels of exposure to global market fluctuations.
Because Iceland was the clearest example of a country 
prevailing over the financial crash, many authors have scrutinized 
this example. I. Skibińska-Fabrowska (531–532) sums up the 
causes of the crisis’ outbreak presented by both Polish and foreign 
authors. M. Budyta-Budzyńska sees excessive investments financed 
by foreign credits in the construction and energy sectors and the 
consequences of economic reforms in the 1990s. Bank privatization 
had induced its managers to seek opportunities of return (and 
profit) abroad. Meanwhile the domestic market was flooded with 
consumption loans that led to over-indebtedness and dynamic 
growth in consumption.
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L. Kurkliński (2010) seeks the causes of the crisis in the banking 
sector deregulation that happened after the privatization of the 
biggest Icelandic banks. This allowed for the combining of investment, 
corporate and commercial banking. K. Pruchnik (2012) debates 
that it was not the liberal reforms but the malfunctioning of public 
institutions, mainly Seðlabanki and financial supervision which were 
the causes that led the whole country to the brink of bankruptcy. 
Ingimundur Fridriksson (2009) draws attention to exceptionally 
favorable conditions in the global financial markets at the beginning of 
the 21st century. Freedom to provide services abroad that was used by 
Icelandic banks, which willingly combined high liquidity in the global 
market with extra-ordinary low interest rates as well as high ratings 
of countries, had made these credit sources seem almost limitless. 
A. C. Sibert (2011) presents an interesting notion emphasizing the 
excessive penetration ratio of banking in Iceland while having its 
own currency, making the country vulnerable to a run on the banks 
(understood as uncontrolled withdrawal of deposits and suddenly cut 
off from financing sources).
Initial signs of the recession in Iceland were visible in the years 
before 2008. The earliest signs of the collapse were already seen in 
2003 during the construction of the Reyðarfjörður aluminum plan. 
This investment equaled 1/3 of Icelandic GDP and led to significant 
growth in the current account deficit. In 2003, three of the biggest 
Icelandic banks were privatized. After this Landsbanki, Glitnir and 
Kaupthing started extensive international expansions. Most of their 
securities were investments in US securities and funds. In 2004, 
banks assets equaled 100% of Iceland GDP, as Danielsson (26) 
shows in 2007 it was more than 900%, making Iceland exposed 
to unfavorable tendencies in financial markets. Manipulation of 
interest rates as well as a lack of control of the banking sector and 
internal irregularities and fraud led to the inevitable collapse of the 
Icelandic banking system. The last cause of Icelandic breakdown 
was the lowering taxes in 2007 that resulted in a rise in salaries 
that led to an increase in disposable income for households. 
A growth in consumption was observed, followed by inflationary 
pressures with the current account deficit rising to 25% of GDP.
A direct cause, or maybe even the first stage of the crash, was 
the loss of capacity to refinance short-term liabilities by Glitnir, 
Landsbankinn and Kaupthing. Landsbanki and Kaupthing ’s 
liquidity was lost due to a run on foreign branches of these banks. 
On 6th October 2008, the Prime Minister of Iceland threw Icelandic 
society into shock when three weeks after the collapse of Lehman 
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Brothers he announced that the three biggest banks were no longer 
able to finance their liabilities.
4. Crisis timeline.
3rd October 2008 the European Central Bank makes a margin 
call of 400 million to Landsbanki. Even though this decision is 
taken quickly, it has a strong psychological impact on the British 
branch of the bank where panic spreads (Decyzja Urzędu Nadzoru 
EFTA nr 290/12/COL z dnia 11 lipca 2012 r). 
6th October Alþingi passed emergency legislation (Emergency 
Act No 125/2008) enabling the government to intervene extensively 
in Iceland’s financial system. Fjármálaeftirlitið (FME – Financial 
Supervisory Authority) is given power to take control over the 
financial institution and disposal of its assets. It became clear 
that Icelandic banks are no longer able to finance its short-term 
liabilities.
29th September the nationalization of Glitnir is announced 
in an attempt to stop the bank from sharing the same fate as 
Landsbanki and Kaupthing (7th October). The last step that finally 
plunges the entire Icelandic financial system into meltdown was 
the British government’s decision to pass anti-terrorism legislation 
to freeze Kaupthing assets as an answer to the Icelandic banks’ 
insolvency.
9th October the last and the worst effect happens. The 
Icelandic stock market is suspended and re-opens five days 
later (14th October). The new session sees a fall of 70% on the 
ICEX15 index.
15th October Seðlabanki cuts the interest rate from a record 
high of 15.5% to 3.5%. Initial estimates states that British tax-
payers might have lost close to £1 billion. The Icelandic state is 
on the edge of bankruptcy. Icelandic government turns to IMF 
to get loan for saving the state.
20th November the International Monetary Fund approves 
a $ 2.1 billion loan for Iceland. Iceland becomes the first Western 
European nation to receive an IMF loan since 1976.
The social situation
The reaction of Icelandic society is no less important than 
the dramatic market changes in the state. Just before the crisis, 
Icelanders were probably even more in debt than US citizens. The 
Iceland’s Financial Crisis in 2008… 121
American lifestyle was highly influential in Iceland, especially 
“life on credit”. Icelanders had bought not only houses and cars 
on credit, but also computers and other home appliances. It would 
not be an exaggeration to say that every single Icelandic person 
has taken out a loan at least once in their lives, but most citizens 
had been indebted to Icelandic banks when they collapsed. Part 
of society also owned both deposits and savings accounts, since 
Icelandic banks offered highly competitive interest rates. Due 
to the depreciation of the Króna, Icelanders had lost up to 70% of 
their savings.
Citizens felt the crisis on many levels: “the withdraw of money 
and foreign transfers were restricted, the prices of import goods 
doubled. Before the crash Icelanders had taken out loans for 
houses, cars and other luxury goods with basically no limits. 
Then they started to have trouble paying off the loans, especially 
with the highest installments in foreign currency loans” (Budyta 
– Budzyńska, 98). Before the crisis, Icelanders followed the ruling 
party’s (Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn) doctrine that made them believe that 
it is time to use years of hard work and bring puritan austerity 
to a close. The ruling party persuaded people that it was the 
perfect moment to build a house, buy a better car or spend their 
winter holidays in warmer climes. Obviously, all this could be done 
with credit that was available to everyone (Przemiany polityczne 
na Islandii w warunkach kryzysu bankowego i gospodarczego, 19). 
The sudden devaluation of the Króna and higher repayments 
were beyond most Icelanders’ financial capabilities. Moreover, the 
anger of people rose along with the behavior of the government 
especially the Prime Minister Geir Haarde and the head of 
Seðlabanki Davíð Oddsson, who were well-known for financial 
embezzlement on a grand scale as well as enormous estates. They 
simply belittled the social issues to care only about their own 
business2. Demonstrations had already begun in 2008 but by 
January 2009 even larger protests known as ‘the pots and pan 
revolution’ were taking place3.
2 Kamil Pruchnik calls such a phenomenon crony capitalism, pointing out 
that disordered privatization process had been held. Power and governance in 
the biggest companies went into the hands of influential businessmen closely 
connected with the government. Such a situation led to business depending on the 
goodwill of the government (e.g issuing licenses, tax refunds and tax exemptions 
or public auctions on favorable conditions) and not to free market competition.
3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sbVml3P4FBY
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Starting from 20thJanuary 2009, thousands of people protested 
in the main square in Reykjavik, just in front of the Alþingi building. 
At this point it seems important to emphasize that the previous 
demonstration in Iceland had taken place in 1949 while discussing 
Icelandic membership in NATO4. 
Protesters wanted the government to step down and set up 
a new election date. Clashes with police took place, along with 
the use of tear gas and the arrest of demonstrators (Icelandic 
protesters demanded the government step down). In the end the 
protesters won – on 26th January Prime Minister Geir Haarde 
announced his resignation along with the whole government 
and set up a new election date for 25thApril 2009. The new Prime 
Minister of the temporary government was Jóhanna Sigurdardottr 
(Samfylkingin).
Emerging from the crisis
The most important decision (supported by citizens), both 
from an economic and social perspective, was not to save banks 
by all means and not to use quantitative easing, but letting the 
banks fall. This saved the whole country from the situation that 
was observed in Greece and Spain. Such a decision put the whole 
country on the edge of bankruptcy, yet as the years after have 
shown, the risk was worth taking. Lowering interest rates as 
well as a devaluation of the Króna by up to 70% (1 euro = 90 ISK 
before the crisis, at its lowest, the exchange rate of the Króna 
equaled 1 EUR = 340 ISK, the current exchange rate is 1 EUR 
= 124 ISK) was possible due to the fact that Iceland is neither 
a member of the Eurozone nor a big state. The exchange rate 
of the Króna is now under restricted control. Of course such 
a decrease of the country’s currency value that is so dependent 
on foreign markets pushed the inflation rate up to a peak of 
18% in 2009. Between 2009–2010 it was necessary to limit the 
rise in salaries (Islandia kpi z Europy). Due to such a drastic 
devaluation of the Króna, living conditions in Iceland became 
more difficult as prices went up, yet it also resulted in the 
4 One can surely say that protests or demonstrations in Iceland was seen as 
absolutely the last resort in the average citizen’s view. The decision of so many 
people to protest shows how desperate the nation was during the crisis especially 
concerning the ruling elites and government behavior.
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recovery of the economy mostly based on export and helped in 
developing a relatively new branch – tourism. Healthy sectors of 
Icelandic economy were able to help the whole country recover 
and rebuild the economic potential with the favorable conditions 
of global markets. More and more tourists started to visit Iceland 
which was undoubtedly a positive driving force of the post-crisis 
economy. The fact that the liabilities of three biggest Icelandic 
banks were 75% denominated in foreign currencies prevented the 
government from paying off all deposits, since their value greatly 
exceeded the value of the Guaranty Fund and official reserve 
assets of Seðlabanki (Wajda-Lichy, 199). 
In this regard, international aid – such as the loan from the 
IMF (2.1 billion dollars), also Polish participation (200 millions) 
for foreign reserve assets and the enormous help from the Nordic 
countries was indispensable and allowed a substantial amount 
of money to be pumped into the Icelandic financial system 
(Background information on Nordic loans to Iceland). Help from 
the IMF was strictly connected with the reconstruction of the 
entire financial system of the country that after significant 
changes had to focus mainly on the internal market. Controlled 
flow of capital was introduced and became a tool to diminish 
the effects of the crisis. New banks were established to replace 
collapsed ones – New Landsbanki, Arion Banki and Islands 
Banki. Moreover, a commission to administer the insolvency 
assets of previous banks was created. The issue of debts of 
foreign branches was far more complicated.
Icesave
Icesave was a product of Landsbanki between 2006–2008 for 
both the British and the Netherlands market that offered saving 
accounts on very favourable conditions (Figure 5). In Britain there 
were three types of accounts: immediate – access saving accounts, 
ISA and fixed rate bonds. The interest rate of these accounts was 
more than 6%, making it one of the best offers for clients in Britain 
between 2006–2007. At the time of its collapse, Icesave handled 
more than 300 000 clients in the UK, whose total value of deposits 
was around 5 billion dollars.
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Figure 5. Conditions of Icesave accounts in Great Britain
Immediate-access 
savings account
ISA
FIxed rate savings 
account
High interest rate 
– 6.30% AER*
High fixed interest rate 
– up to 6.76% AER*
High interest rate 
– 6.10% AER* (variable) 
– what's more, the tax 
man won't get a penny 
of your interest
We guarantee the AER 
will beat Base Rate* 
by at least 0.25% until 
1 October 2009 and at 
least match Base Rate 
until 1 October 2011
Save a lump sum for 
6 months, 1, 2 or 3 
years
We guarantee the AER 
will beat Base Rate* 
by at least 0.30% until 
31 January 2011 and at 
least match Base Rate 
until 31 January 2013
No notice period for 
withdrawals
Interest rate fixed for the 
term of the account
No notice period for 
withdrawals
No penalties for 
withdrawals
Choose when you receive 
your interest
No notice period for 
withdrawals
Choose to receive your 
interest monthly or 
annually
Save from just £1,000
Choose to receive your 
interest monthly or 
annually
Start saving with just 
£250
No withdrawals or 
additional deposits can 
be made during the 
term
Start saving with just 
£1,000 and save up 
to £3,000 each tax year
Source: Own elaboration, data: http://web.archive.org/web/20080202162406/
www.icesave.co.uk/ savingsrange.html-
Alþingi created the Icesave bill 1 in 2009. It anticipated 
returning the money to the governments of Britain and the 
Netherlands, which paid their citizens compensation money 
(almost 3.9 billion EUR deposited in Icelandic bank). The act 
was positively voted in Alþingi and signed by President Ólafur 
Ragnar Grímsson in September 2009, yet neither Britain nor 
the Netherlands agreed to this because of the condition that 
put a time clause on repayment until 2024 when any remaining 
liabilities would be automatically cancelled. The second proposal 
was put forward by the UK and the Netherlands (Icesave bill 
2), where the condition of the time clause was removed. 
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Alþingi accepted the bill, yet the President vetoed5 it leading 
to a referendum. More than 90% of the voters were against the 
solution proposed in bill 2. The next agreement (Icesave bill 3) with 
the UK and the Netherlands was not signed until December 2010. 
The new agreement granted favorable repayment terms. The most 
important change was the lower interest burden. In February 
2011, Alþingi ratified the agreement, yet once again it was vetoed 
by the President ,resulting yet again in another referendum in 
April 2011 (Budyta-Budzyńska, 101). Once again Icelanders voted 
against the bill, assuming the next generations of tax payers 
would be burdened with repayments, when they believed the 
crisis was a result of bad governance in the banking system 
and of leading politicians. Because of a lack of an agreement, 
the case was addressed at the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) Court. After Landsbanki collapsed, the governments of 
countries not only demanded the return of receivables for their 
citizens, but also made the Icelandic State Treasury responsible. 
Iceland presented a position that during the crisis in 2008,the 
government did its utmost to make sure that all deposits were 
returned. “This was made possible by changing the ranking of 
such claims in the case of the winding up of the banks, securing 
distributions ahead of general unsecured creditors. This has 
proven to be a necessary and successful measure as the UK 
and the Netherlands have already received approximately 50% 
of their total claims and stand to be paid in full” (Judgment 
in the Icesave court case due on January 28). The EFTA Court 
ruling on Icesave, on 28th January 2013, rejected all claims by 
the EFTA Surveillance Authority. The Court rejected the claim 
that Iceland has breached the Deposit Guarantee Directive or 
had discriminated against depositors contrary to EEA law.
Quoting professor Hannes Hólmsteinn Gissurarsson, 
a lecturer of political science on Háskóli Islands, the only method 
to overcome the crisis that a small country such as Iceland 
could afford to fight on their own (Kryzys? Islandia nie ratowała 
banków, ale uciekła przed widmem Unii). One has to emphasize 
5 Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson was the first president in history, who used his 
veto power against an act accepted in Alþingi. The veto against Icesave bill was 
the second ever case in Icelandic state history. This shows how important this 
decision was for the whole society. See more: Pascale J., Olafur Ragnar Grimsson 
re-elected for a 5th mandate as Head of State in Iceland, 4 May 2015, http://www.
robert-schuman.eu/en/eem/1315-olafur-ragnar-grimsson-re-elected-for-a-5th-
mandate-as-head-of-state-in-iceland
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the incredible ability of Icelanders to adapt. This ability was 
created during centuries of fighting in a harsh climate as well 
as foreign governance over the island from the 12th century 
to the 1940s. The qualities of Icelanders such as a national 
unity against injustice, seen during the years of Danish rule, 
significantly contributed to the success of Iceland during the 
later crisis. The nation stood together against corrupt officials, 
politicians and bankers6. 
Summary and predictions
The case of Iceland is often cited as a fortunate overcoming 
of the financial crisis. It is hard to deny that in comparison with 
other countries such as Greece, the Icelandic model (Figure 6) was 
a successful solution. From the perspective of seven years since 
the recession began in Iceland, the steps taken by Seðlabanki 
and the Icelandic government can be judged as a success. The 
controversial decision of letting the banks’ collapse and to be 
later taken over by the state as well as the use of macroeconomic 
tools to achieve positive, yet long-term benefits, turned out to be 
a good remedy for the crisis.
6 After the crisis many preventive proposals were considered e.g. changing 
currency (Canadian dollars or euros without joining the EU). The crises revived 
ongoing discussions about the need of EU membership. The government led 
by Prime Minister Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir proposed accession to the EU 
structures. (See more: Legutko A., Europejski wymiar polityki Islandii „Zeszyty 
Naukowe Skandynawistyki”, vol. 3, 2014). On 23rd June 2009 Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Óskar Skarphéðinsson officially submitted a request to Carl 
Bildt, President of the EU Council. The case of EU membership after the crisis 
recovery has become less and less important in public discourse. It seems 
that after the worst wave of financial crisis had dissipated and the Icelandic 
economy had started to recover, Icelandic accession to the EU was pushed 
into the background. In mid-May 2015 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iceland 
Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson announced, after consulting with government, that 
Iceland was no longer interested in becoming a part of the EU. Due to this 
fact, the government withdrew from accession procedures and requested 
a suitable act that confirmed the end of the negotiations. The letter was 
answered by the Latvian Foreign Affairs Ministers, since Latvia held the 
EU Presidency, and the need of strong co-operation and friendly ties were 
highlighted (see more: Foreign Ministry: Iceland’s EU Application off the 
Table [2015] 20 May 2015, http://icelandreview.com/news/2015/03/12/
foreign-minister-icelands-eu-application-table.
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Figure 6. Prevailing over the crisis – the Icelandic Model
Prevailing the crisis - Icelandic Model
taking over banks by state
first phase of crisis: active use of fiscal tools and exchange rate as automatic 
stabilizers
capital grow control
debt restructuring for domestic entities combined with amortization of the part 
of the credit
consolidating public finances
Source: Own elaboration
The Icelandic Króna has appreciated, inf lation and 
unemployment rate has dropped and the Icelandic economy once 
again is developing at a stable pace and enjoys good financial 
health.
Figure 7. GDP growth prediction between 2015–2019
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
GDP 3,8 3,2 2,8 2,7 2,5 
0 
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1,5 
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2,5 
3 
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4 
Source: Own elaboration, data: http://www.hagstofa.is/
GDP that in 2009 dropped to -5,1%, in 2014 rose to 1,9%. 
Unemployment rate that during the crisis was 8%, in 2014 fell 
to 3.6% and HagstofaÍslands forecasts a downward trend in the 
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following years (Figure 7). The inflation rate which was 12.4% in 
2008 declined to 2% in 2014. In a five-year period it should not 
exceed 3% (Figure 8).
Figure 8. Unemployment rate and inflation rate prediction between 2015–2019
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Inﬂa�on 1,7 3 2,8 2,7 2,5 
Unemployment rate 3,1 3 2,9 3 3 
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Source: Own elaboration, data: http://www.hagstofa.is/
It is worth noting that the loan taken from the IMF was repaid 
before the set deadline. Undoubtedly, the reason of Icelandic 
prevailing over the crisis was the fact that the country is small. 
The importance of this factor is rarely mentioned but Thorhallson 
underlines of the country’s small bureaucracy, leading to a shorter 
decision making process, faster adaptation to changing conditions in 
the domestic and global economies. The case of Iceland confirms this 
thesis. The Icelandic economy adapted fast to the low exchange rate 
of the Króna, using its competitive advantage in exports and the rapid 
development of the tourism sector. Drastic and risky steps, including 
control of capital and the refusal of refunding foreign liabilities, in 
the Icelandic case was dictated by the enormous scale of obligations 
that significantly surpassed the financial capabilities of such a small 
economy. The banking sector just before the crisis exceeded 900% 
of the state’s GDP. One of the reasons, apart from being a small 
state, that makes the Icelandic strategy unsuitable for other counties 
was that the depreciation of the exchange rate is impossible to use 
in the case of the Eurozone countries which do not operate their 
own currency and carry on commercial activity mostly with other 
countries of the European Monetary Union. A drop in the value of 
the Króna has had an impact on the dynamic development of healthy 
economic sectors such as tourism and exports, allowing Iceland 
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to rapidly overcome the crisis. The solution that was implemented in 
Iceland in 2008 and 2009 can hardly be seen as a new model to be 
used in different countries. Such radical moves would not be possible 
in countries of higher populations and geographical sizes, or which 
have more developed economic branches, and finally, which are part 
of the EU, and especially the Eurozone.
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